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COMMENT
The State vs. The Family:
Does Intervention Really Spare the Child?

Courts all across this country are attempting to balance the interests of
children and parents. It has long been the general rule that natural parents, if considered fit, have the right to the custody of their children,
uninterrupted even by a state exercising its parens-patriae power., This
right of the natural parent has traditionally taken precedence over the
interests of everyone else, including the best interests of the child.'
There has been a recent trend, however, toward paying more attention
to what the court feels is in the best interests of the child. Although the
law is still weighted in favor of the natural parent, courts are increasingly
willing to interfere with parents' rights if called for by the best interests of
the child.3 One example of this trend is exemplified by those courts which
have recognized the importance of the "psychological parent" as explained
by Goldstein, Freud and Solnit in their book, Beyond the Best Interests of
the Child.I
This trend toward the best interests of the child, while often very beneficial for the child, heralds an increase in the state's parens patriae power
to intervene in the lives of its citizens. Although the reasons behind intervention and the results of it are often desirable, we must consider the
consequences of permitting more state intervention. 5
One area which deserves attention is that of moral unfitness as it applies
to parents in termination cases. The applicable Georgia statute says:
1. See Chapin v. Cummings, 191 Ga. 408, 12 S.E.2d 312 (1940), and Williams v, Crosby,
118 Ga. 296, 45 S.E. 282 (1903).
2. "Under the Georgia statute, the only questions before the court in a proceeding for the
adoption of a child are: (1) do the natural parents consent to the adoption of the child, or, in
some instances have they abandoned the child so as to dispense with their consent as a
prerequisite; (2) are the adopting parents worthy and able to care for the child; and (3) is
the adoption for the best interest of the child? The court is not required to declare the
adoption unless all three of these factors unequivocally appear. If there is no parental consent
and the natural parents have not abandoned the child, the court is required to deny the
adoption. If either or both of the other factors are absent, the court may deny the adoption."
Herrin v. Graham, 87 Ga. App. 291, 291-292, 73 S.E.2d 572, 573 (1952), citing Allen v.
Morgan, 75 Ga. App. 738, 747, 44 S.E.2d 500, 506 (1947) (emphasis in original).
3. Cf. Chapin v. Cummings, 191 Ga. 408, 12 S.E.2d 312 (1940).
4. J. GOLDSTEIN, et al., BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD (1973).
5. See Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (Summer, 1975).
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The court by order may terminate the parental rights of a parent with
respect to his child if:
(2) the child is a deprived child and the court finds that the conditions
and causes of the deprivation are likely to continue or will not be remedied
and that by reason thereof the child is suffering or will probably suffer
serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm.'
In other words, the State of Georgia has the power to terminate a parent's
right to his or her child if that parent is found to be morally unfit or if the
child's morals are found to be threatened. Even if one agrees with this
power in theory, the questions remain: Who has the power to decide exactly what constitutes moral unfitness? Where are the guidelines to follow
in making such a decision? Of course, the ultimate query is whether the
state should have such intervention power at all.
In reality, the presiding judge in a parental-rights-termination case is
given the power to impose his or her own moral standards on the parents.
According to Mnookin,
[ain indeterminate standard allows a court to evaluate parental atti-

tudes and behavior on the basis of the judge's personal values. An indeterminate standard invites reliance by the judge on personal values, and this
is especially risky when class differences confound the problem ...
Even though there are other plausible explanations for the high proportion
of foster children from poor families, present-day juvenile court standards
allow a judge to import his own personal values into the decision-making
process and therefore leave considerable scope for class bias.7
The Georgia Code provides no definitive outline of what conduct or
parental teachings constitute behavior so unacceptable that parents may
be deprived of their own child.' Do such parents have even a chance for
meaningful review of such decisions? Justice Gunter, dissenting in Bennett
v. Clemens,9 remarked, "[W]ith all due deference to my brothers of the
majority, I think that they merely substituted their standard of morality
for that of the natural parents of the child in affirming the judgment
below."°
6. GA. CODE ANN. §24A-3201(a) (1976). See also ORE. REV. STAT. §107.105(1)(a) (1973)
("the court shall consider the best interests of the child and the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties"); UTAH CODE ANN. §30-3-10 (Supp. 1973) ("the
court shall consider the best interests of the child and the past conduct and demonstrated
moral standards of each of the parties"); ALA. CODE tit. 34, §35 (1958) ("...
having regard
to the moral character and prudence of the parents...").
7. Mnookin, supra note 5, at 269 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
8. "Every state, except perhaps Maine and West Virginia, include in their jurisdictional
statute at least one extremely vague and broad provision, allowing jurisdiction over a child
who is not receiving 'proper' care or attention." Mnookin, supra note 5, at 241 n. 68.
9. 230 Ga. 317, 196 S.E.2d 842 (1973).
10. Id. at 323, 196 S.E.2d at 845.
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As early as the first part of the nineteenth century, the states had welldeveloped powers to intervene if the state decided that intervention was
necessary.
[A]ithough, in general, parents are intrusted with the custody of the
persons, and the education of their children, yet this is done upon the
natural presumption, that the children will be properly taken care of, and
will be brought up with a due education in literature, and morals, and
religion; and that they will be treated with kindness and affection. But,
whenever this presumption is removed; whenever (for example) it is
found, that a father is guilty of gross ill treatment or cruelty toward his
infant children; or that he is in constant habits of drunkenness and blasphemy, or low and gross debauchery; or that he professes atheistical or
irreligious principles; or that his domestic associations are such as tend
to the corruption and contamination of his children; or that he otherwise
acts in a manner injurious to the morals or interests of his children; in
every such case, the Court of Chancery will interfere, and deprive him of
the custody of his children."
Today, such power, or "state paternalism,"'" does not appear to fit in
with this country's continuing attempts to promote individual freedoms
and family autonomy. 3 The U.S. Supreme Court, which often stresses the
importance of the family, has, in Stanley v. Illinois," gone so far as to
classify the right to "raise one's children" as "essential;" the Court said
that "[t]he integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 5 Despite such expressed
sentiments, many state courts, including those of Georgia, continue to
expand the traditional bases for state intervention in domestic matters.
The broad discretion exercised by judges is also exercised at the initial
stages of the termination process. Investigators and complainants from
social-welfare or probation offices, in deciding to petition for termination
of parental rights on the ground of moral unfitness, in effect are deciding
what behavior and what ideas are harmful to a child's upbringing. Not only
do these case workers decide which family "needs" intervention by the
state, but they also make recommendations about the disposition to
judges, who generally consider them extremely persuasive." This farreaching power, given rather arbitrarily to people who happen to be employed in certain agencies, should be frightening to citizens; it is an unjustifiable encroachment upon basic family rights. The power becomes even
11. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 702 (7th ed. 1857) (emphasis
added) (footnotes omitted).
12. Mnookin, supra note 5, at 266-267.
13. Id.
14. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
15. Id. at 651.
16. For just one example of the weight given to a caseworker's testimony, see Moss v.
Moss, 135 Ga. App. 401, 218 S.E.2d 93 (1975).
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more frightening in light of evidence "that many public social work agencies have untrained or poorly trained staff."' 7
It is paradoxical that we are granting such discretionary power over the
lives of our citizens to persons at every stage of the judicial process when
it is generally admitted by psychological professionals that experts are not
yet able to make accurate predictions of the effects of various means of
upbringing.
[Tihe determination of what is "best" or "least detrimental" for a particular child is usually indeterminate and speculative. For most custody
cases, existing psychological theories simply do not yield confident predictions of the effects of alternative custody dispositions. Moreover, even if
accurate predictions were possible in more cases, our society today lacks
any clear-cut consensus about the8 values to be used in determining what
is "best" or "least detrimental.'
The dangers implicit in broad discretionary powers in initial custody
procedures are further demonstrated by the results of a study conducted
on the factors considered in decisions affecting child placement. Three
professionals in the area of child welfare were given 94 case files and were
asked to decide whether the child in each case should be removed from the
family unit. The professionals agreed on less than half of the cases and
could not agree on the determinative factors in the agreed cases." "In spite
of . . . advances," wrote Anna Freud, "there remain factors which make
clinical foresight, i.e., prediction, difficult and hazardous ...
[Elnvironmental happenings in a child's life will always remain unpredictable since they are not governed by any known laws .
",20
It has also been demonstrated that the damaging effects of childhood
trouble have been overestimated. Similar childhood experiences do not
affect all children in the same manner; some individuals put what appeared to be "severe pathology to constructive use."'" Removing a child
from his or her family environment, regardless of the high-minded, wellmeaning reasons prompting it, may often have more adverse consequences
than allowing the child to remain in a questionable situation. There is "no
evidence whatsoever that foster care is psychologically therapeutic," 2 and
it may, in fact, be harmful. Few will argue that institutionalizing a child
or allowing the child to be continually shifted from one foster home to
17. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic
Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 998 (1975).
18. Mnookin, supra note 5, at 229.
19. M. PHILLIPS, et al., FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH PLACEMENT DECISIONS IN CHILD WELFARE
69-84 (1971).
20. A. FREUD, CHILD OBSERVATION AND PREDICTION OF DEVELOPMENT - A MEMORIAL LECTURE IN HONOR OF ERNST KRIS, 13 THE PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 92, 97-98 (1958).

21.

A.

SKOLNICK, THE INTIMATE ENVIRONMENT, EXPLORING MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 378,

379 (1973).
22. Mnookin, supra note 5, at 278-279.
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another is a beneficial result of termination of parental rights. In such
cases, the results and the concomitant effects on the children concerned
should be kept in mind. 3 It has been suggested that to separate a child
from his or her parents (natural or psychological) can be the psychological
equivalent of "orphaning."" Wald stresses the importance of the continuity of relationships and asserts that the psychological damage caused by
separating a child from his or her family may in reality be more detrimental to the child "than the harm intervention is supposed to prevent."
What is the solution to the arbitrariness of our neglect and termination
laws? The simple answer, obviously, is to frame the applicable statutes in
more positive, concrete terms to avoid unwarranted intervention into the
family unit. This is no simple task," of course, but it is imperative to our
judicial system's concepts of due process. "[Ijmprecise standards inevitably create uncertainty, unpredictability, and a lack of clear rules of law to
guide judicial discretion."" Imprecision is especially dangerous when we
are dealing with such a subjective and highly emotional area as moral
unfitness. If no distinct guidelines are available for the court's use, we are
inviting the continued increase of state intervention into our private lives.
Such intervention should not be permissible, regardless of the benevolence
of the purpose, unless tangible evidence clearly shows that there will be
severe damage to the child and that such damage will almost certainly
continue to be inflicted.2" Some commentators take this thesis a step further and insist that, as Wald says:
[C]oercive intervention should be permissible only when a child has
suffered or is likely to suffer serious physical injury as a result of abuse or
inadequate care; when a child is suffering from severe emotional damage
and his parents are unwilling to deal with his problems without coercive
intervention; when a child is sexually abused; when a child is suffering
23. See Mnookin, supra note 5.
24. Freud, Some Remarks on Infant Observation,8 PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD
17-19 (1953), discussed in Note, Alternatives to "ParentalRight" in Child Custody Disputes
Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151, 160-161 (1963).
25. Wald, supra note 17, at 994.
26. This writer has never seen a satisfactory definition of "unfitness," for example. One
of the relatively few attempts can be found in Comment, The Law of Custody and Its
Adequacy, 10 KAN. L. REV. 560, 561 (1962).
27. Foster and Freed, Child Custody (PartII), 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 615, 626 (1964).
28. "A reappraisal of the neglect jurisdiction of juvenile courts is indeed necessary. In
contrast to those who advocate extending the reach of neglect laws, I submit that a narrowing
of neglect jurisdiction is needed. The sympathetic appeal of beaten, malnourished, or helpless
children is a strong inducement for expanded intervention. However, because legislators and
judges presume the beneficence of such intervention, there is a great temptation to intervene
too often, and restraints placed on the exercise of coercive state power elsewhere are minimized or disregarded in the child neglect area. Since our society values the principle of family
autonomy and privacy, we should carefully examine any decision to coercively limit parental
autonomy in raising children." Wald, supra note 17, at 987 (footnotes omitted).
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from a serious medical condition and his parents are unwilling to provide
him suitable medical treatment; or when a child is committing delinquent
acts at the urging or with the help of his parents. 9
Whether state intervention in the family on the ground of moral unfitness is eliminated or simply limited to clarify and specify such open-ended
terms as "moral unfitness," we will be proceeding in the right direction.
We must take steps to escape from the present situation, in which more
states have legislation regulating moral neglect than physical neglect,3
and in which it is possible to attempt the enforcement of societal norms
through parental custody proceedings.
SusA R. ROGERS
29.
30.

Wald, supra note 17, at 1008.
Id. at 1033.

